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ABSTRACT 
The coordination plays central role in the economics. The conventional 
economic theory looks at the market and enterprise (or hierarchy) as two 
different, separated manner of coordination of economic goods and 
services. However the modern organization theory, price theory and 
institutional economics show that different types (not only market and 
enterprise, but also several types of hybrid forms) of coordination (or 
governance structure) necessarily live together in the current economic 
system.  
Based on my previous research on the field of regional clusters in the 
food industry I came to the conclusion that the cluster is one of the 
spheres where economic coordination can occur. At the same time I 
pointed out that the ways of coordination can be ordered on an ordinary 
scale according to its normative or positive nature. 
                                                 
* Research was supported by Hungarian funds OTKA T 046882 and NKFP 4_014_04. I’ve also found that the choice between the coordination spheres (market, 
enterprise or cluster) is not arbitrary, but instead depends on the interest’s 
dimension which is represented by the exchange of goods and services in 
question. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The question of economic coordination became widely debated issue 
among economic theorists (Kornai, 1983, Williamson, 2002). These 
approaches “are all alike in their acceptance of organizations as entities 
to be analyzed in order to understand the allocation, coordination, and 
creation of resources” (Ménard, 1996).  
The analysis of food industry’s clusters in Hungary has guided me to 
recognition that in these clusters the most important object of economic 
exchange is the information among cluster members. If the information is 
matter of supply and demand, what factors and in which way of 
mechanism determine the equilibrium on that specific exchange? – it was 
the question, I tried to clarify in this paper.  
 
1. REGIONAL CLUSTERS AND COORDINATION 
It is an important fact of cluster analysis that geographical concentration 
advantages in a given area cannot, or can only rarely be, identified 
entirely. A cluster cannot therefore be broken down into enterprises, as in 
a wider sense all of them share in the given advantages as part of the 
cluster. It follows that the expression ‘regional cluster’ is an abstraction, 
as definite geographical borders of the cluster may not be known. 
However, in order to deal more deeply with this issue we need a notion 
of a cluster as a form of cooperation which solely incorporates just those 
obviously sharing some geographical advantage.  
There exists no definable common activity among enterprises working in 
the same agglomeration area in the absence of special relationships. 
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 Those identifiable external effects and interactions belong to the 
definition of clusters: 
  A locally qualified workforce available 
  A concentrated presence of suppliers 
  Vertical relationships among members of a cluster 
  Intensive information exchange between enterprises and 
institutions 
  Diversified institutions and infrastructure endorsing 
specialized activities of a cluster 
  Trust and common sense of socio-cultural identity among 
members based on the same values.  
In a cluster, among the complex set of interactions, emphasis is rather 
based on ‘soft’, non-measurable factors like trust, creative ability and 
knowledge ‘spill-over’. Therefore a precise cluster definition based on 
which sharp line of demarcation could be drawn between pure 
agglomerations and complex clusters is not possible. Commonalities of 
different cluster-aspects, nevertheless, may be given: 
-  Some permanent cooperation is observable between enterprises 
-  Enterprises share their resources with each other 
-  Enterprises create intensive relationships with local institutions  
-  Cooperating enterprises and institutions are concentrated 
geographically 
Nonetheless, clusters also can be interpreted from the enterprise theory 
point of view, by which we get closer to an exploration of factors for 
economic success and competitiveness and thereby to a demonstration of 
the development possibilities for competitiveness positions based on 
management of clusters. The market, the enterprise, and in addition, the 
cluster, is a scene of change transaction. In order to use change to explain 
the market, the enterprise and the cluster in the same way, the definition 
should be general enough. Accordingly, “change transaction is a transfer 
between actors, in which one party allocates some goods, information or 
knowledge to the other party, which the other party has not had before, 
and by which this latter can obtain advantages”
  (Kapás, 2002). 
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 In a cluster, the object of change transaction is typically information or 
(special) knowledge. Information and knowledge change has the 
extraordinary specialty – due to frequency of changes in relationships – 
of being mostly random, but the intensity of the relationship guarantees 
its materialization. 
A cluster then – similarly to a market or an enterprise – is a coordination 
field of change (mainly of information and knowledge) and is not a 
coordination mechanism of its own but rather the place of its 
materialization. Therefore, systematization of the mechanisms 
coordinating the exchange (even in the field of clusters) is needed. 
 
2. ECONOMIC COORDINATION IN DIFFERENT FIELDS 
We can define “change-transactions” as transfers of goods or services 
across a technologically separable interface (Williamson, 1985). If we 
have a deeper knowledge about the attributes of these transfers, we can 
come closer to understand, why a transaction will be ruled by one form 
of governance rather than other.  
We know from transaction economics, that three major features 
characterize the transactions: uncertainty surrounding it; frequency of 
transactions; and specificity of assets involved in these transactions. 
Upon these attributes we can configure a rule of thumb, how to take an 
appropriate choice between the market and organization (enterprise). 
Higher  uncertainty needs more and closer coordination preferring 
internal solutions like integration and concentration.  “Frequency has 
more ambiguous effects: on one hand, it makes transactions easier to 
observe and monitor, lowering costs of contracting through markets; on 
the other hand, it allows implementation of routines that are easy to 
supervise, which may be favorable to organizations.” (Ménard, 1996) 
Asset specificity is considered to be the most tested and justified 
explanation of the existence of enterprise (organization/hierarchy) 
(Williamson, 1985; Joskow, 1987). High specificity indeed supports the 
decision of incorporating the asset within the frame of organization. 
Based only a contract it often creates a trap: it can induce opportunistic 
agents to take advantage of incomplete contracts. Therefore the more 
specific assets are, the stronger is the incentive to integrate. 
Coordination is central problem of economics. Traditional economic 
thought treats market and enterprise as two discrete, insular mechanisms. 
4 
 In the last decade, observance of a spread of diverse hybrid forms – like 
clusters – has raised the question whether coordination mechanisms 
really exist in such a discrete, insular form (Coase,  1937/2004, Ménard,  
1996). Market – like an enterprise - cannot be treated as a coordination 
mechanism, but rather a result or field of coordination. The diverse 
existence of hybrid forms – like clusters – certifies that the existence of 
coordination mechanisms in different proportions finally determines the 
concrete field in which coordination takes place. 
The ways of economic coordination can be set on an ordinal scale, in 
which ‘positive’ coordination is meant (through a competitive price 
system) to create market equilibrium. Market competition, based on 
supply-demand circumstances, decides whether economic decisions of 
market actors are adequate. The realized price cannot be judged and does 
not contain any values. The price mechanism of a market thereby 
positively defines the equilibrium price without any reference to pre-
defined values, so this coordination rightfully composes the starting 
point of an ordinal scale. 
The situation is totally different in the case of ethically-incurred types of 
economic coordination (e.g. corporate social responsibility, inheritance, 
bestowal, etc.). Here there naturally exists an a priori value-order or 
normative aspect, based on which the decision comes into existence. 
Such transactions are regulated by totally different mechanisms to those 
belonging to the field of positive coordination. Ethical coordination is 
thereby rightfully treated as one located near the normative end point of a 
sequence scale of economic coordination mechanisms. 
It is evident that various stages exist between the two points which 
incorporate some characteristics of coordination found in both positions. 
It is also natural that there are no unequivocal demarcation terminologies; 
furthermore, a difference can not be interpreted between various modes 
concerning ‘positivity’, or ‘normativity’. Table 1 summarizes that which 
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If the market and enterprise are rather the sphere of coordination than 
that of the way, we have to put the question, whether the asset specificity 
really can orient the appropriate choice of coordination place? In contrary 
to traditional and empirically well tested answers (Smith, 1776; Coase, 
1937/2004; Williamson, 1985; Ménard,  1996, e.t.c.), we dare say that 
asset specificity is just a part of the reasons, which adjust our choice. 
Based on our investigation the dimension of interest, rather than the 
asset specificity is the key term in choosing the suitable place of 
coordination. The “interest” term is used in accordance with the 
explanatory dictionary: “necessary and important item (thing), which 
serves in favor or utility of somebody or something” (Szmodis, 2005). In 
this approach asset specificity is just part of the n dimension interest: 
one dimension may affect the efficient utilization of that particular 
specific capacity of production (e.g. grape harvesting machine), but 
another dimension effecting the same transaction at the same time may 
touch the safeguard of specific professional knowledge which is 
generated and maintained via using this specific asset, e.t.c. In this way 
the more the dimension the stronger is the need for modes of 
coordination other than just the positive one.  
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 It is also evident that, in different coordination fields, coordination modes 
are present simultaneously but there always exists one which clearly 
typifies the given field and gives it its main character. This thought is 
presented in Figure 1. 
 














Source: Authors’ own composition 
In Figure 1, there is no distinct hierarchy between fields of coordination. 
Meanwhile, it is important to see that various coordination problems can 
be managed in different fields by economic actors. From this point of 
view, for example regional clusters are primarily appropriate for 
managing such economic problems where the main characteristic of the 
core coordination problem cannot be typified by only (material) 
dimension. There exists some common value-order, some normative in a 
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 given region, orientation to which seems evident to market actors. This 
value-order is not ethical in its nature by all means but represents such an 
economic value like e.g. the excellence of a wine-regions’ wine. This 
value becomes a common organizing force for grape producers and wine 
processors. We state that from the aspect of success or commitment in 
competition, whether someone reckons this common value as one’s own 
and takes it into consideration during one’s economic decisions is of 
prominent importance. 
 
3. CHOICE OF THE COORDINATION FIELD 
Now, we are able to give a general rule for making choice between 
different fields of coordination. During my research in the past ten years 
(Popovics-Tóth, 2005, Tóth, 2003, 2005, 2007) I came to the conclusion 
that the market, the enterprise and the cluster have got the same 
substance: all of them serve the same economic function, namely they are 
the fields, where economic transactions take place. Regarding that they 
serve for the same function, they can be analyzed with the same methods 
and tools. At the same time they are separated from each other with 
respect to the creation- and maintenance cost of equilibrium in the 
different coordination fields as well as the dimension of interest which is 
represented by the object of transaction. In this concept not only the 
“transaction cost” (c.f. Williamson, 1991), or the “governance cost” (c.f. 
Ménard, 2004) is taken into consideration. Transaction and governance 
cost refer first of all the market and enterprise/hybrid as fields of 
coordination. The concept of “equilibrium creation- and maintenance 
cost of coordination field” is much broader. In addition to transaction or 
governance cost it also includes e.g. the recovery cost of market crisis, or 
the financial consequences of a malfunctioning market regulation 
measure generated by the government. In this way the transaction- or 
governance cost can be regarded as integral part of this latter one. 
Following these considerations we can make optimal choice between the 




 CHOICE BETWEEN COORDINATION FIELDS 
Figure 2 
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Source: Based on Williamson (1991) and Ménard (1996, 2004), the authors’ own 
composition 
 
According the general rule the market as coordination field has got 
economic advantages compared to the enterprise till the dimension of 
interest exceeds d
1. After this point the enterprise supplies more 
economic benefits in terms of less costly solutions. When the object of 
the transaction represents highly compound interest, the cluster, then the 
region or even the whole society seems to be the most appropriate field 
of economic coordination. 
Neither the market players nor the decision makers are probably not 
conscient rule followers in this respect. Although the parallel presence of 
all these coordination fields in the economy reflects the fact that the 
actors would like to spare with coordination cost, so the general rule has 
got influence on their decisions. 
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 CONCLUSION 
The previous discussions have brought us closer to some conclusions. 
First, we have argued, that the market (as well as the enterprise, cluster 
and network) is more the place of coordination, than that of the “modus 
operandi”.  Second, we can stay that there exists an ordinary scale of 
ways of coordination based on the nature of “positivity” and 
“normativity of the mode of coordination. On the positive end of this 
scale the pure market competition is located, while the other end is 
occupied by the ethic based coordination. Third, we have pointed out that 
finding a suitable place for coordination the dimension of interest of the 
transaction is more orientating than just the specificity of asset: the more 
the dimension the stronger is the need for modes of coordination other 
than just the market competition. Finally, we have found that the choice 
between the coordination fields depends not just on the transaction and 
governance cost, but on the equilibrium creation- and maintenance 
cost of coordination field as well, which is much broader than the former 
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